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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E. H. HUBER and
RALPH DUNKLEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,

No. 69166.

vs.
VICTOR NEWMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Motion
Appellant respectfully moves the court for leave to file
the accompanying reply to Respondents' answering brief
served Dec. 25th, 1943, in this appeal.

0. H. MATTHEWS,
P. G. ELLIS,
Attorneys for Appellant.
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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
E. H. HUBER and
RALPH DUNKLEY,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

No. 69166.

VICTOR NEWMAN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Memo. Reply Brief
We shall be as sparing as possible but feel that we
should notice a few points in respondents' brief, belatedly
filed. We allocate our remarks to the page numbers of that
brief.
Page 3. They cite Gibbs v. District Court, 44 Pac. 2d
· 504, in opposition to our citation of Rozelle v. District Court,
39 Pac. 2d 1113, (both Utah cases). We reply that the Gibbs
case does not purport to overrule or modify the Rozelle ease,
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but distinguishes the Rozelle case on its facts and applies
the law to the variant facts of the Gibbs case.
Respond,ents assume that there is such an analogy be-

twee~ the facts of the two cases that the latter decision
. .

in

'

effect overrules or modifies the former. Such is not the
case. It is the privilege and function of this court to decide
that question, and whether a later decision modifies or displaces a former one. It decided that question in the negative
in the Gibbs case, and distinguished that case on its facts
from the Rozelle case. It held that the Rozelle case is not,
on its facts, contrary to or inconsistent with the Gibbs case,
even though it so appears on first glance. Thereby it quieted
any doubts on the subject and marked out the field oi .law
dpminated by each case. In the Gibbs case the analogy here
claimed by respondent was urged but rejected by this court,
and that settles it.
One chief difference in the Gibbs case is that the complainant sought relief by the writ of prohibition, which is
a high prerogative writ issuable only in the discretion of
this court, used sparingly, and only where grave mischief
may result, irreparably, in case of delay. It is never granted
as of right, or of course. And it construed the facts of that
case not to he of that nature, nor to raise a serious juris..
dictional question. It ruled that under the specific facts of
that case, as set out in the opinion, the trial court had a
measure of discretion whether it would try the main questions first and the accounting later, or whether it would
combine the whole in one hearing. Having that discretion
the Supreme Court refused to interfere with its exercise.
In the Rozelle case it had held that an attempt by the t:fial
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court to go into an accounting between the parties on ,tb~
theory that they were partners without any evidence that
there was a partnership, was an act in excess of jurisdiction.
And the question was presented in that case by appeal, which
searches a record and reviews all errors whether procedural
or jurisdictional. The writ of review was granted in that case
merely to stay the hand of the trial court until the jurisdictional question could be determined on the concurrent appeal.
Quite a decisive difference from the remedy sought andrefused in the Gibbs case.
The case at bar is exactly like the Rozelle case and hence
is ruled by that case. That is, the complaint, issues and
remedy sought are the same. And the review is by appeal
in both cases, not by prohibition as in the Gibbs case. Partnership alleged but not proved the same as in the Rozelle
case, but in this case plaintiff Dunkley himself expressly
testified to the contrary (our opening p. 26), that there was
no general partnership agreement covering all these transactions.
In the Gibbs case this court held that on the facts of that
case the trial court had discretion, with which it would not
interfere by prohibition. In this case we have neither invoked prohibition, nor sought to interfere with discretion,
nor asked this court to do so. Our remedy is by appeal which
searches the record for all errors whether procedural or
jurisdictional. The trial court took its own course (as we
contend, the correct course), in its decision to try the question of partnership first; and if it should find partnership
then it would order an accounting. (Our opening brief p.
11-13.) In so doing, it ruled out all testimony and questions
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~~·; e'lther side that would become proper if and wh(m -an
·ac~ounting might be taken up. And it stated that if it should
find ·against partnership it would dismiss the complaint and
th~re would be no accounting (our openingp.l2). Both sides
yielded to this ruling and put in only evidence respecting the
partnership issue. Hence there is no possible occasion for
invoking the Gibbs case ruling that the order of procedure
{on the facts of that case) is discretionary and will not be
controlled by the writ of prohibition. It was not so interfered
with in this case.
'At the conclusion of the second day's trial, when both
sides 'had rested, the· court announced from the bench its
conclusion that each of these jobs were joint ventures,
directed preparations of findings and decree accordingly,
a~pointed a referee, and told the parties to appear before
the· referee with their books and witnesses (our opening
brief p. 52). The trial court's views as to procedure were
put into practice without objection from either side. Hence,
n'either the Gibbs case, nor either of the others associated
therewith in citation in counsel's brief, have any bearing on
the case here. Even if apropos, this Court has settled the
law 'in: this jurisdiction.
. The difficulty in this case is that the trial court after
.e:xercising its. discr.etion (whether discretionary or juriS,d~c
tional it -does not matter) to try this case in two parts, to
· wit:..partnership first, accounting second, and after haying
·tried the .first part separately, never did proceed to a trial
of:the second part, i.e.~ accounting. It never tooktestimpny
:of:witnesses in open court on that subject, and.:neither.;Q.id
the referee ever do so.. But the latter cooked .UP an, accpJ,l;nt-
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iBg of his own from unsworn sources, and so we have never
bad any trial at all. But the trial court rendered jud~ent
against defendant for $19,451.03 without any evidence a~
all that defendant owed plaintiffs anything.

Their page 6. They say finding 1 agrees with. their
pleading parag. 1 and 2. We say it comprehends much more
and so does their judgment. They pleaded only the railroad
job, hospital job and Harrison-Dorman job, but their finding
embraces also the Stearns-Rogers job, the Geer job, and the
Fort Douglas, all balled up together in one lump sum recovery. Findings and judgment which transcend the pleadings
and issues are void. (Cases cited in our opening brief p. 58.).
They say their allegation and finding number 3 agree.
That is immaterial. The real question is whether they performed their contract, if they had one, not whether they
performed their understandings. Nobody can tell what they
understood.
Their page 7. They say that their pleading and finding
No. 4 agree that there was no definite term agreed on for
their supposed partnership agreement. Whether this is so
or not, we say that this contention (coupled with plaintiff
Dunkley's undisputed testimony in open court that there
never was any general agreement or contract of partnership
covering all jobs, but each job was a separate undertaking
independent of all others-our opening p. 26), prevents recovery by plaintiffs of any amount whatever. Because of
the three jobs mentioned in the complaint, two of them lost
money, so there were no profits to divide, regardless of
whether there was a partnership or not, and the remaining
hospital job was never undertaken on joint or common ac-
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cotiht. But defendant gave them notice on the very day that
job was taken, that they were not to share profits on it, but
they could remain and work at $100 a week if desired, eltte
quit. They elected to stay on wages for a short time, th~n
quit, while defendant completed the job himself from beginning to end, on his own resources. This testimony was not

disputed by plaintiffs by any evidence at the trial. So that
defendant was under no obligation to take them in on the
profits.
Their pages 8-12. In their discussion here respondents
overlook the issues as to negligence, failure to keep complete
and separate accounts on the jobs, misappropriation of funds,
and botching everything, so they had to be fired at length.
Even were they partners they would be answerable for all
this, no matter whether appellant was damaged and injured
as a partner or as an employer. Plaintiffs were asking for
the accounting, and would themselves have to account aml
do equity in order to obtain equity. Findings were necessary
on these issues, after a trial upon sworn testimony of witnesses.
Their·pages 12-13. They try to dodge the issue here by
saying that their complaint alleged partnership while the
court found joint adventures. If this was a vital distinctiQn
they would be out of court, because they alleged one thing
and proved the other. We have not seen fit to raise that
question in our first brief, and do not see fit to do so now.
In other respects they straddle the issue on their p.13. What
we .argued under assignment 3 was that the trial jud~e
misconstrued the evidence that plaintiffs were to share
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profits on certain jobs as compensation for their labor and
services, by treating it as conclusive evidence of partnership.
Their page 14. The colloquy set out on page 14 of coun~
sel's brief is misleading. No such stipulation was made by
Mr. Morrissey on behalf of defendant Newman. And if he
had have, it would not be binding on his client in view of
the latter's explicit testimony to the contrary, and also that
of Mr. Dunkley in sundry particulars we collected in our
opening brief. But Mr. Morrissey did not so intend. To
understand this we must give a brief resume of the previous
proceedings. The trial court had, at the conclusion of the
first two days trial in April, 1943, announced its conclusion
that:
"It seems to me that these were joint ventures
on these jobs mentioned in the complaint, i.e., the
railroad job, the hospital job and the Harrison-Darman job ;-the hospital job up to Sept. 3rd.
(Further discussion)

"On Sept. 3rd, the joint venture on all these oper~
ations ceased at that time." (See our opening brief
pp. 50-51.)
The Court was in error both as to fact and dates. There
was never any joint venture (or sharing of profits) agreed
to or undertaken on the hospital job, but notice was given
to plaintiffs on the very day the contract on that job was
taken, that there was to be no profit-sharing on that job,
but they could work on weekly wages or quit. They elected
to continue at work on that job pursuant to that notice and
one of them at least actually drew wages at $100 a week
thereafter. (Our opening brief p. 41-47.) Huber quit and
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iVent elsewhere on or before Sept. 1st, 1942, while Durildey.
worked a couple of weeks longer, then he quit. Some part of
the work on this job was completed on Sept. 3rd, 1942, but
:n~t all of it. It was not fully completed by Newman qntil
J.~n. 21, 1943 (our opening p. 46). It was done throughou~
by Newman from his own resources, and he alone had th~
cyontract with the Government and the responsibility, ~n~
he it was who gave the performance bond.
~

· As to the railroad job, it was completed at some time
prior to Sept. 3rd, but the evidence does not show just when:
There was no evidence of joint venture on this job, but it
was a loss, no profits, in any event. See our opening brief
p. 47-48.
As to the Harrison-Dorman job, it was never completed.
For reasons explained in the .record work had to be suspended
on it, and the parties never went back to it. There was a
heavy loss and no profits on this job. See our opening brief
p. 38-41.
Nevertheless the trial court chose to conclue that these
three jobs were all "joint ventures" as above quoted. And
thereafter the three jobs were referred to by both court
and plaintiffs' counsel as joint venturers in line with the
dassification so given them. Defendant's counsel nowhere
agreed to the correctness of the court's views or terminology,
but they understood what the court meant after the court
had so ruled. And they were not obliged to protest or object
every time thereafter that the court or counsel chose to use
the expression of "joint ventures."
With this resume, we may better understand the court's
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later remark or query quoted by counsel on page 14 of
brief, viz:
•,

\..

thei~

"I think the record-perhaps Mr. Callister got
this into the record, but to make sure, the court would
like to say that it is admitted by all parties that M~.
Newman and Mr. Dunkley at least were agreed that
the joint venture would terminate on Sept. 3rd."

'fo which Mr. Callister at once said:
"I think that is right, your honor, and we will so.stipulate."
As a matter of fact there had been no such agreement or
admission ever made by Mr. Newman that any joint ,venture
ever existed, on either one of these jobs, save possibly, in
effect, with respect to the Harrison-Dorman job, by his testimony abstracted on pages 38-41 of our opening brief. And
all work on that job had been stopped and abandoned by
both plaintiffs and defendant some time prior to Sept. 3rd.
Work on the railroad job had been finished before Sept. 3rd,
though plaintiffs were not partners or joint venturers on it
(our opening p. 47-48). Of course, Mr. Callister was glad
enough to get in on such a stipulation as the court· implied.
Following Callister, the record recites that Mr. Morrissey
said: "Yes."
, The only justifiable implication from this assent, in
view of the above state of the record, is that Mr. Morrissey
was willing to agree that there were no joint venture operations, as the court had been using that term, thatcontinu~d
on past the date mentioned by the court, or Sept. 3rd, 1942.
J:Ie positively did not mean or intend to give away his client's
I

'
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rights, -nor to surrender the benefit of defendant's <>ft re.
peated testimony and protestations that he never did enter
into any joint venture agreement with Huber and Dunkley
Qn this hospital job, nor for that matter, on the railroad job.
And the Harrison-Dorman job was certainly abandoned before that date in an uncompleted condition, and the work was
completed by the Curtis Gravel Go. at a loss. Certainly
it could be conceded that all claims of the plaintiffs
to participation in each of these jobs as joint ventures had
been ended or terminated by or before Sept. 3rd, without
admitting that they ever had any such status. Neither
court nor counsel could have been deceived or misled by
it in the above condition of the record. The hospital job
is the only one of the three that made any money, and the
plaintiffs were given definite notice that they were 'out
of it on that job on the very day the contract was taken.
Pages 14-15. There is no such uncontradicted testimony
as claimed by counsel at bottom of his page 14 et seq. The
uncontradicted testimony is exactly to the contrary. See
testimony of both Dunkley and N ewrnan quoted to the record
on pages 26-27 of our opening brief.
Pages 15-16. The testimony ~ere is unfairly handled
by counsel. In view of the undisputed evidence that Newman gave plaintiffs notice on the very day he took the
hospital contract that they were not to share profits but
could remain and work for $100 a week wages (opening brief
pp. 41-47), there is no basis for the contention that he was
influenced to terminate it afterwards by his later discovery
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that he was going to make money on that job. Newman
always made money on his jobs except those on which
Dunkley and Huber worked, such as the Harrison-Dorman
job, railroad job, Geer job and Fort Douglas job. They copped
all the money on the Geer job and Stearns-Rogers jobs and
Newman got nothing; likewise on the Ft. Douglas job,
though he furnished all the capital and equipment save two
trucks.
Pages 16-20. This discussion is covered by what we
have said herelri in our discussion of the Rozelle and Gibbs
cases, ante.
As regards the so-called receiver's report, it was a void
document on its face because, among many other reasons,
code section 104-27-6 was disregarded in its preparation. It
showed illegal procedure and illegal sources of information
on its every page and by the testimony of its author. So it
did not matter whether it was "in" or "out," filed or not.
It was still void, and the Court was prohibited by statutes
cited in our opening brief from either treating it as evidence
or basing any judgment upon it.
Page 22. They say with respect to Dansie's report that
it did not attempt to resolve the issues of fact in favor of
any party. We say in reply that is one of its vices which
makes it of no value for any purpose. That is one of the
statutory duties of a referee, his prime duty, to determine
the issues of fact and make findings that will settle the
issues, and do it upon sworn testimony at that. He must
sit as a court, swear witnesses, hear competent testimony,
exclude incompetent evidence, make findings of fact and
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submit to the court a proposed decree as. well as fiqdiftgs"His: 'failure to do any of these things robs his report of ~ny
vital'ity or legal standing. Nor CO"!Jld it, acquire these virtues
by the mere filing of it, as counsel seems to suppose. Filed
or not it was a mere dead and lifeless thing. It could not
help or harm any one, filed or unfilE1d.
Counsel's definition of the duties of. a referee does not
agree with our code sections 104-27-6, 104-27-7, 104-54-5,
104-39-8, and having been given as advice to the referee
whose appointment he obtained, destroyed the value of his
work. His conception is that a referee is a mere auditor,
not that of a statutory referee.
Page 23. The statement that Dunkley's testimony regarding yardage was sufficient and uncontradicted is without record support. See our opening brief pp. 107-110. It
does not support itself.
Page 26. The brief says that when evidence before a
referee is not reported the findings are yet final and cannot
be disturbed on appeal. The answer to this is that the
referee made no findings, heard no evidence from sworn
witnesses, took no pains to follow the law, and presented no
report that is even prima facie valid. It shows on its face
his recourse to hearsay· and all sorts of illegal information.
Page 27. They say that it is fundamental that if a
party desires to challenge the report of a referee he should
do so within proper time. That is true, but a party is not
put upon his· challe·nge u:ritil there is a report of a referee
presented. A mere nullity does not concern anyone. As
Judge Straup says, "Its nullity will keep, and is not mellowed
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by age.·,· This is not the case of a judicial record that is faJr
and perfect upon its face, requiring allegation and proof tq
overthrow it. It is completely null and void on its face, fro;qt
beginning to end, denounced by statute, and insupportable
from· any point of view.

It is probably useless to go on through this 34 page
brief of respondents counsel, at the risk of tiring the court.
Its errors are glaring on almost every page. They say on
page 15 that plaintiffs advanced some of their money to pay
employees. If so, it was precious little, and they took out
of the bank account and otherwise withheld from plaintiff
far more money than they ever put in. Wherefore defendant's insistance that they account to him fully and completely. They had no right to commingle their private funds
with those of their employer, and it was an abuse of trust
to do so.
On pages 32-34, they seek to justify the exaction of a
bond from defendant as a condition to partial relief from an
unjust and unfounded judgment of over $19,000.00. Their
void referee report allowed only about $12,642.97 (our ope~
ing p. 147) after crediting plaintiff with various illegal
exactions which are unsupportable on this record. The balance in excess of $12,642.95, or $6,808.06 is represented by
plaintiffs' share of $10,212.09 unpaid labor and expense bills
which they themselves ought to pay, not Newman, on the
theory that they were partners or joint venturers on the
Harrison-Dorman job. What they asked, however, and what
the court consented to give them, was that they have judgment for the sum of $19,451.03 if plaintiffs would give him
a bond for $7000.00 to refund the $6,808.06 of it, in ca~e
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plaintiff should later be compelled to pay those 'bills of
$10,212.09 on the Harrison-Dorman job. They never gave
this refund bond of $7000.00 as ordered by the court. Notwithtanding, however, the judgment was entered for the:
full $19,451.03 (without a refund bond) and plaintiffs then
p~oceeded promptly to get out an execution and to garnishee
appellant's funds in his bank account. To release which
appellant had to put up a stiff cash deposit as an appeal
bond, to get his bank funds released from garnishment. See
the files and records of this case sent up on appeal.
We think the foregoing adequately shows of what fabric
the respondents' case consists on this appeal. Much more
could be said in detail, but we forbear.
Respectfully submitted,
0. H. MATTHEWS,

P. G. ELLIS,
Attorneys for Appellant:
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